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Abstract
We construct a simple model to demonstrate how the rm-level degree of scale economies
(D-SE) is determined when rms make technology choice. In particular, we illustrate the
importance of external factors that aect the eciency of rms' technology choice, such
as public knowledge stock, when determining D-SE. A change in public knowledge stock
aects D-SE both directly and indirectly through a change in the rm's output. When
output is endogenized in a monopolistic competition model with a variable mark-up rate,
an increase in public knowledge stock raises D-SE through technology choice if the mark-up
rate is increasing in output.
Keywords: Degree of scale economies; Technology choice; Public knowledge stock;
Variable mark-up rate.
JEL classication numbers : D21, D24, F10, F12, L11, L16.
1 Introduction
Economists have well recognized that rm-level scale economies are crucial in shaping
various economic phenomena, such as intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1979, 1980) and
rms' spatial agglomeration (Krugman, 1991). In empirical studies, the rm-level degree
of scale economies (D-SE), dened as output's elasticity with respect to the total input at
the rm level, is important for accurately estimating total factor productivity (TFP).1)
Corresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-
ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. E-mail address: shintaku.shitanku@gmail.com.
1) Many empirical studies assume that the D-SE for the Cobb-Douglas production function equals one,
but if it is over (under) one, TFP is over (under) estimated.
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The literature, however, neglects the role of rms' technology choice in determining
D-SE. In reality, rms can choose their technology level by controlling the quality and
type of patents, machinery, labor, and management systems. Recent studies (Yeaple,
2005; Bustos, 2011) have shown that changes in a rm's competitive environment induces
technology choice, dened as selecting both of marginal and technology adoption costs.
Therefore, we need to consider the eect of technology choice on D-SE determination.
This paper examines how D-SE is determined when rms make technology choice. The
essential feature of our analysis is as follows. We endogenize technology choice. As driving
forces of choosing technology that exists but is new for the rm, we consider both rm size
and some factors external to individual rms. The latter include public knowledge stock,
rms' agglomeration, infrastructure, etc. We interpret these factors as public knowledge
stock available to rms.
The main results are as follows. First, when a rm's output is given, D-SE directly
depends on output, xed costs, and public knowledge stock; i.e., an increase in output
reduces D-SE, whereas an increase in public knowledge stock or xed costs raises it, ceteris
paribus. Second, when a rm's output is endogenized in a monopolistic competition model
with a variable mark-up rate, whether an increase in public knowledge stock or xed costs
raises D-SE through technology choice depends on whether the mark-up rate is increasing
in output or constant.
This paper contributes two novel ndings to the literature. First, we show that external
factors such as public knowledge stock aect DSE through their eects on technology choice.
Second, we demonstrate that D-SE changes under variable mark-ups.
2 D-SE under exogenous rm's output
In the following model, a rm's technology choice and D-SE depend on its size in terms
of output. In this section, we focus on a rm's technology choice and analyze its D-SE by
assuming that its output is given. In the next section, we endogenize the rm's output
choice.
2.1 Firm's technology
A rm produces outputs by inputting production factors. For analytical simplicity, we
assume only one input|labor|as a numeraire. The rm has the following technology. Its
production function is y = alP , where y is output level, lp is an input level of production
labor, and a is the marginal product. a can be interpreted as TFP. The marginal product (a)
depends on the levels of spending on technology (lT ). The relationship can be characterized
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by "technology choice function," F , as a = F (lT ; ), where  is a parameter external
to individual rms. This parameter represents factors that aect the eciency of rms'
technology choice. Those factors may include public knowledge stock, rms' agglomeration,
infrastructure, etc. We interpret this as public knowledge stock available to rms. We
assume F (0; ) > 0, FlT > 0, and F > 0. FlT > 0 means that rms can reduce the
production cost by paying a higher technology choice cost. F > 0 represents the whole
economy's technological spillover.
2.2 Optimal technology choice
The rm faces the following cost-minimization problem. We dene variable input (variable
cost), lV , as lV
def
= lT + lP . The rm minimizes lV by selecting a pair of (lT ; lP ), given y.
This problem characterizes the optimal technology choice, (lT ; lP ), conditional on y. The
rm faces this problem after paying xed cost (lF ) for entry. lF mainly represents the costs
of obtaining physical assets and constructing a distribution network.
To characterize the solution clearly, we introduce a "technology upgrading rate" (ET ).
ET is dened as the elasticity of marginal product (a) with respect to spending on tech-
nology (lT ), i.e., ET
def
= (@F=@lT )(lT=F ).
We assume that FlT (0; )y=[F (0; )]
2  1 for arbitrary (y; ) and FlT lT < 2(FlT )2=F
for arbitrary (y; ; lT ). The former certies the optimal lT > 0; the latter certies the
second-order condition of the optimization. These assumptions characterize the optimal
pair of (lT ; lP ), conditional on y, as follows.
Lemma 1. 2) For arbitrary y > 0 and  > 0, the optimal levels of lT and lP are positive;
these are completely characterized by y = F (lT ; )lP and the following relationship:
ET =
F (lT ; )lT
y
: (1)
This lemma shows the characterization of the optimal technological choice and addi-
tionally implies that an increase in ET raises lT , given y.
We impose two important assumptions for ET to clarify the following analysis. First,
for analytical simplicity, we assume that ET depends only on : @ET (lT ; )=@lT = 0.
3)
Second, we assume that ET is increasing in : dET (lT ; )=d = @ET (lT ; )=@ > 0.
4) This
assumption seems to be natural because of public knowledge stock's property. Now, we
2) Proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in the appendix.
3) This condition is equivalent to FlT lT lT =FlT +1 = FlT lT =F , implying that lT = FlTF=[(FlT )
2 FFlT lT ].
We assume (FlT )
2   FFlT lT > 0 to certify lT > 0.
4) This condition is equivalent to FFlT > FlTF.
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should distinguish between technology choice and technology creation. Existing knowledge
reinforces technology choice while restricting technology creation.
Lemma 1 derives the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For arbitrary y > 0 and  > 0, the following properties hold. (a) An
increase in  reduces lP and lV while ambiguously impacting lT . (b) An increase in y raises
lT , lP , and lV .
In (a), the impact on lT is ambiguous because an increase in public knowledge stock has
two opposite eects: raising the return on technology investment relatively to production
labor (positive eect) and saving technology investment through a free ride on the existing
public knowledge (negative eect).
In (b), the impact on lT is positive, corroborating previous studies' ndings.
The assumptions for ET , @ET (lT ; )=@lT = 0, and @ET (lT ; )=@ > 0 certify the
result of (a), although it does not aect the result of (b). In particular, the assumption of
@ET (lT ; )=@lT = 0 derives @lV =@ < 0. Both these assumptions derive @lP=@ < 0.
We should note that the impacts on lV are dierent in (a) and (b). This leads to
dierent impacts on D-SE.
2.3 Two types of degree of scale economies
For later analysis, we dene two types of degree of scale economies. One is D-SE (with
xed costs), which we denote as SED, dened as SED
def
= @ log y=@ log l, where l represents
total labor input, i.e., l
def
= lF + lV . The other is the degree of scale economies without xed
costs (D-SEV). We denote D-SEV as SEVD, dened as SEVD
def
= @ log y=@ log lV . Equation
(1) derives the following relationship:
SEVD = 1 + ET: (2)
(2) implies that D-SEV has a one-to-one correspondence to the technology upgrading rate
for arbitrary output level.
2.4 Three channels aecting D-SE
The relationship of (2) reveals channels aecting D-SE as follows.
Lemma 2. For arbitrary y > 0 and  > 0, SED = SEVD(1 + lF=lV ) holds.
This lemma means that D-SE depends on D-SEV and xed and variable costs. Fur-
thermore, D-SEV and variable costs depend on public knowledge stock and output. Hence,
D-SE essentially depends on output, xed costs, and public knowledge stock.
4
In this section, y, lF , and  are exogenous. We investigate how changes in these
exogenous variables aect D-SE using Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 2. (a) An increase in y reduces SED. (b) An increase in lF raises SED. (c)
An increase in  raises SED.
These results can be explained as follows: (a) An increase in output raises variable costs
but does not aect D-SEV, thereby reducing D-SE. (b) An increase in xed costs directly
raises SED but does not aect D-SEV and variable costs, thereby raising D-SE. (c) An
increase in public knowledge stock raises D-SEV and reduces variable costs, thereby raising
D-SE. All these results depend on the assumption of @ET (lT ; )=@lT = 0. The result (c)
also depends on dET ()=d > 0.
As is well known, xed costs create rm-level scale economies. Proposition 2 implies
that this is true even when rms make technology choice. Furthermore, we show that some
external factors, such as public knowledge stock, can aect D-SE.
3 D-SE under an endogenous rm's output
In this section, we construct a market equilibrium and endogenize y. Then, changes in lF or
 aect y. We analyze how D-SE (SED) depends on xed cost (lF ) and public knowledge
stock () through this eect.
3.1 Specication of technology choice function
For analytical simplicity, we specify the technology choice function F (lT ; ). From the cost
minimization problem, the following technology is chosen.
Lemma 3. We specify F (lT ; ) as F (lT ; ) = l

T . Then, when the rm makes technology
choice optimally, ET =  holds, and the optimal level of lT and lP conditional on y is given
by lT = y
1=(+1) and lP = y
1=(+1)=. The variable cost function can be uniquely specied
as lV = [(+ 1)=]y
1=(+1). Then, SEVD = + 1, @MC=@y < 0, and @MC=@ < 0 hold,
where MC denotes the marginal cost in the optimal technology choice.
In the above specication, all assumptions for technology choice function and the fol-
lowing new properties hold. lT is decreasing in  and MC is decreasing in y and .
3.2 Market structure
To endogenize y, we have to specify the market structure.
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Consider an economy wherein a monopolistically competitive industry. Households
supply labor inelastically and wage is exogenous. All these economic agents are symmetric.
The preference of the representative household is represented by U =
R n
0
v(xi)di, where
v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and xi(> 0) is consumption of variety i (Krugman, 1979). We dene (xi)
as (xi)
def
=  v0(xi)=[v00(xi)xi].  coincides with the demand elasticity for each variety with
respect to price.
3.3 Market equilibrium
The rm's decisions are as follows. The rm decides whether to pay lF to enter the market
rst, selects a pair of (lP ; lT ) second, and selects a pair of (y; p) last.
After entering the market, the rm minimizes variable cost by selecting (lP ; lT ) and then
obtains a variable cost function as l = [( + 1)=]y1=(+1) + lF . Next, the rm maximizes
the prot, , by selecting (y; p). Note that  is given by  = py   l. Since rms have the
market power, the prot-maximization (PM) condition is given by PM : p = (y)MC(y),
where (y) is the mark-up and is dened as (y)
def
= 1+ 1=[(y)  1]. We assume (y) > 1
and d=dy  0.
The rm can enter the market freely till its prot is zero. The free-entry (FE) condition
is given by FE : p = l=y.
The PM and FE conditions and MC = lV =(ySEVD) give the following PM-FE condi-
tion:
PM-FE : (y) = SEVD()

1 +
lF
lV (y; )

: (3)
(3) gives a unique inner equilibrium, y .5)
3.4 An increase in public knowledge stock and xed costs
(3) derives the impacts of an increase in  and lF on (y; lT ; SED) as follows.
Proposition 3. In a unique inner equilibrium, an increase in  or lF raises y and has
ambiguous impacts on SED. It raises (or does not change) SED if (y) is increasing in y
(constant).
This proposition shows that an increase in xed costs and public knowledge stock
aects D-SE in the same way. Both raise (do not raise) D-SE through technology choice,
depending on whether the mark-up rate is increasing in output (constant). Thus, it is
critical whether the mark-up rate is constant or variable. The role of the mark-up rate
is explained as follows. In (3), when the mark-up rate is increasing in output, changes in
5) Necessary and sucient conditions are given in the Appendix.
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public knowledge stock or xed costs adjust not only lV but also the mark-up rate. This
then raises y moderately and weakens the negative impact of an increase in y on D-SE.
Hence, the increasing mark-up rate derives a larger D-SE. The IT revolution and an increase
in foreign direct investment may be interpreted as an increase in . Thus, Proposition 3
implies that these factors can increase D-SE if the mark-up rate is increasing in output.
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Appendix
In this appendix, a hat indicates the rate of change for any variable, e.g., x^
def
= dx=x. We
introduce SlF , SlV , SlP and SlT , which are dened as SlF
def
= lF=l, SlV
def
= lV =l, SlP
def
= lP=lV
and SlT
def
= lT=lV , respectively. In subsections F and G, we introduce  and , which are
dened as 
def
= 1=(+1) and 
def
= (+1)=. Hence, we can rewrite lV = [(+1)=]y
1=(+1)
in Lemma 3 as lV = y
. We should note that  < 1 holds from the denition of  and
 > 0.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
First{order condition
The variable cost (lV ) minimization problem can be rewritten as maximization of  lV . We
construct Lagrangian, L as follows:
L =  (lP + lT ) + y[y   F (lT ; )lP ] + P lP + T lT
The rst order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by
@L
@lP
=  1  yF (lT ; ) + P = 0; (A.1)
@L
@lT
=  1  yFlT (lT ; )lP + T = 0; (A.2)
@L=@P  0, P  0, (@L=@P )P = 0, @L=@T  0, T  0, (@L=@T )T = 0, and
@L=@y = 0.
These conditions characterize (lP ; lT ; lV ) as follows. If lP = 0 holds, y = F (lT ; )lP does
not hold for y > 0. Then, we obtain lP > 0. lP > 0 and (@L=@P )P = 0 derive P = 0.
(A.1), (A.2) and P = 0 derive
1  T = FlT (lT ; )lP
F (lT ; )
: (A.3)
If lT = 0 holds, T > 0 and lP = y=F (0; ) hold. These properties and (A.3) derive
FlT (0; )y
[F (0; )]2
< 1: (A.4)
(A.4) contradicts the assumption of FlT (0; )y=[F (0; )]
2  1. Hence, we obtain lT > 0.
lT > 0 and (@L=@T )T = 0 derive T = 0. Then, T = 0, (A.3) and y = F (lT ; )lP derive
(1). Q.E.D.
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Second{order condition
We dene the bordered hessian, ~H, as follows:
~H =

0  @(FlP )
@lP
 @(FlP )
@lT
 @(FlP )
@lP
@2L
@lP
2
@L
@lP
@L
@lT
 @(FlP )
@lT
@L
@lT
@L
@lP
@2L
@lT
2
 : (A.5)
The second{order condition for the maximization is ~H > 0. From (A.5), ~H > 0 is equivalent
to the assumption of FlT lT < 2(FlT )
2=F from
~H =

0  F  FlT lP
 F 0  yFlT
 FlT lP  yFlT  yFlT lT lP
 = ylPF [2(FlT )
2   FFlT lT ] > 0$ FlT lT < 2(FlT )2=F:
Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of property (a)
We totally dierentiate y = alP by keeping y xed and obtain
a^+ blP = 0: (B.1)
We totally dierentiate a = F (lT ; ) and obtain
a^ = ET blT + ^; (B.2)
where  is dened as 
def
= F=F . From F > 0,  > 0 holds. (B.1) and (B.2) derive
blP + ET blT + ^ = 0: (B.3)
(1) and assumption of @ET=@lT = 0 derive ET () = lT=lP . We totally dierentiate this
equation and obtain
b = blT   blP ; (B.4)
where  is dened as 
def
= ET=ET . From assumption of dET=d > 0,  > 0 holds.
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(B.3) and (B.4) derive (blP ; blT ) as follows,
blP =   + ET
1 + ET
^; (B.5)
blT =    
1 + ET
^: (B.6)
(B.5) implies @lP=@ < 0. (B.6) implies that the sign of @lT=@ is ambiguous because sign
of     is ambiguous.
We totally dierentiate lV = lT + lP and obtain
blV = SlP blP + SlT blT : (B.7)
Equations (B.5)-(B.7) yield blV =   
1 + lT
^: (B.8)
(B.8) implies @lV =@ < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of property (b)
We can rewrite (1) as
y =
F 2
FlT
: (B.9)
We totally dierentiate (B.9) and when d = 0 holds, we obtain
dlT =
(FlT )
2
F [2(FlT )
2   FFlT lT ]
dy: (B.10)
(B.10) and the assumption of FlT lT < 2(FlT )
2=F yield @lT=@y > 0.
We totally dierentiate y = F (lT ; )lP and when d = 0 holds, we obtain dy =
FlT lPdlT + FdlP . This equation and (1) yeild
dy = F (dlT + dlP ): (B.11)
(B,10) and (B.11) derive
dlP =
(FlT )
2   FFlT lT
F [2(FlT )
2   FFlT lT ]
dy: (B.12)
(B.12) shows @lP=@y > 0 from the assumption of (FlT )
2   FFlT lT > 0 in footnote 3.
(B.10), (B.12) and dlV = dlT + dlP yield
dlV =
1
F
dy: (B.13)
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(B.13) implies @lV =@y > 0. Q.E.D.
C. Derivation of Equation (2)
We take the log of both sides of y = alP and totally dierentiate it to obtain
y^ = a^+ blP : (C.1)
(B.7), (C.1), and the denition of SEVD derive
SEVD =
a^+ blP
SlT
blT + SlP blP : (C.2)
(1) and y = F (lT ; )lP derive SlT =SlP = ET . From SlT =SlP = ET and a^=
blT = ET , (C.2)
can be rewritten as
SEVD =
ET blT + blP
SlP (ET
blT + blP ) ;
=
1
SlP
;
=1 + ET: by SlT =SlP = ET and SlT = 1  SlP (C.3)
Hence, SEVD = 1 + ET follows. Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Lemma 2
By denition, SED can be rewritten as
SED =
d log y
d log l
:
=

dy
dl

l
y

=

dy
dlV
dlV
dl

l
lV
lV
y

=

d log y
d log lV

l
lV

= SEVD

1 +
lF
lV

: (D.1)
Hence, SED = SEVD(1 + lF=lV ) directly follows. Q.E.D.
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E. Proof of Lemma 3
We take the log of both sides of F (lT ; ) = l

T to obtain logF = log  +  log lT . This
equation derives @ logF=@ log lT = . Hence, ET =  holds. This equation and (2) derive
SEVD = 1 + .
F (lT ; ) = l

T and (1) yield
lT = y
1=(+1): (E.1)
y = alP , a = l

T and (1) yield
lP = y
1=(+1)=: (E.2)
(E.1), (E.2) and lV = lP + lT yield
lV =
+ 1

y1=(+1): (E.3)
We dierentiate (E.3) with respect to y to obtain
MC =
@lV
@y
=
y =(+1)

: (E.4)
We dierentiate (E.4) with respect to y and  to obtain
@MC
@y
=  y
 (2+1)=(+1)
+ 1
< 0: (E.5)
@MC
@
=< 0; (E.6)
respectively. Q.E.D.
F. Necessary and sucient condition for a unique inner equilib-
rium
For the following analysis, we dene AC and AV C as AC
def
= l=y and AV C
def
= lV =y,
respectively.
F.1. Additional proposition
Proposition 4. lV is specied as lV = y
, where  and  are positive. Then, the following
properties hold.
(a) If an inner equilibrium, y > 0, exists,  < 1 or lF > 0 holds. If the inner equilibrium
is unique, maxflF ; d=dyg > 0 holds.
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(b) A unique inner equilibrium, y > 0, holds when lF > 0 and one of the following two
cases hold. Case.1: d=dy > 0. Case.2: d=dy = 0 and  > 1=. 6)
F.2. (y; p) Plane
The equilibrium conditions, PM : p = MC and FE : p = AC, depict a curve in (y; p)
respectively. The existence of the intersection certies the existence of the equilibrium. We
represent the right-hand sides of PM : p = MC and FE : p = l=y as PM(y) and FE(y),
respectively.
F.2. Proof of Property (a)
Existence of the inner equilibrium
We prove the existence of the inner equilibrium by contractive induction. We assume
that under   1 and lF = 0, there is y such that y satises FE(y) = PM(y).
From  > 1, PM(y) > MC(y) holds.
On the other hand, FE(y)  MC can shown in the following way. From lF = 0,
AC = AV C holds. This equation and MC = AV C derive AC = (1=)MC. Hence,
FE(y) = (1=)MC holds. From   1, FE(y) MC holds. Hence FE(y) MC holds.
These properties imply PM(y) > FE(y). This contradicts that there is y such that
satises FE(y) = PM(y). Hence, if the inner equilibrium exists,  < 1 or lF > 0 holds.
Q.E.D.
Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium
We prove the uniqueness of the inner equilibrium by contractive induction. We assume
that under lF = d=dy = 0, the inner equilibrium is determined uniquely.
From lF = 0, AC = AV C holds. From d=dy = 0, (y) =  holds for arbitrary y where
 is constant. Hence, PM-FE condition is rewritten as
 =
1

: (F.1)
Since lF = 0 is assumed,  < 1 must be hold if the inner equilibrium exists. From  > 1,
(F.1) holds under certain pairs of (; ).
Since both sides of (F.1) do not depend on y, a number of inner equilibrium can exist.
This contradicts that under lF = d=dy = 0, the inner equilibrium is determined uniquely.
Hence, if the inner equilibrium is determined uniquely, maxflF ; d=dyg > 0 holds. Q.E.D.
6) All of these cases require that PM curve intersects the FE curve only once from below in (y; p) plane,
where PM and FE curves are characterized by PM and FE conditions respectively. This implies that this
equilibrium is stable for an adjustment of the number of rms since @=@n < 0 holds in the equilibrium.
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F.3. Proof of Property (b)
From FE(y)  PM(y) = AC(y)  (y)MC(y) and lV = y, we obtain
FE(y)  PM(y) = lF   (  1)y

y
: (F.2)
We consider a case of d=dy = 0. FE(y)  PM(y) = 0 and (F.2) derives
y =

lF
(  1)
1=
: (F.3)
Hence, under  > 1=, y > 0 uniquely exists.
We next consider a case of d=dy > 0. Since (0) is nite, (F.2) derives limy!0[FE(y) 
PM(y)] =1 > 0. For (F.2), from l'Hospital's rule, we obtain
lim
y!1
[FE(y)  PM(y)] =  (d=dy)y   (  1)y 1 =  1:
Hence, y > 0 exists from the intermediate value theorem. The numerator on the right-hand
side of (F.2) is decreasing in y. Then, we obtain d[FE(y)  PM(y)]=dy < 0. Hence, y > 0
exits uniquely. Q.E.D.
G. Proof of Proposition 3
For the following analysis, we dene the elasticity of  with respect to y, (y), as (y)
def
=
@ log =@ log y, where (y)  0 holds from d=d < 0 and d=dy  0.
G.1. Derivation of the rate of change of variables
From the denition of 
def
= 1=(+ 1) and 
def
= (+ 1)=, we obtain
^ =   
+ 1
^; (G.1)
^ =   1
+ 1
^: (G.2)
We take the log of both sides in (3) and the total dierentials are given by
y^ =
1
SlF + (y)
h
SlF
blF + SlF ^   (SlF log y + 1)^i : (G.3)
(G.1), (G.2) and (G.3) yield @y=@lF > 0 and @y=@ > 0.
14
From Lemma 2, SEVD = 1 +  of Lemma 3 and the denition of , SED = 1=(SlV )
holds. Hence, we obtain SED =  (^ + cSlV ). This can be rewritten as
[SED =
1
SlF + 
h
(SlF )
blF   (SlF )^   (1 + SlF log lV )^i : (G.4)
(G.1), (G.2) and (G.4) derive @SED=@lF > 0 and @SED=@ > 0 if  > 0. If  = 0,
@SED=@lF = @SED=@ = 0 hold. Q.E.D.
G.2. Derivation of Equation (G.3)
(3) can be rewritten as
 =
l
lV 
: (G.5)
We take the log of both sides of (G.5) and totally dierentiate it to obtain
^ = bl   blV   ^: (G.6)
For the right-hand side of (G.6), the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4. l^   blV = SlF [blF   (y^ + ^)  ( log y)^]
On the other hand, for the left-hand side of (G.6), ^ = (y)y^ holds. Hence, we can
obtain (G.3). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
We take the log of both sides of l = lV + lF and lV = y
. Totally dierentiate them
to yield
l^ = SlV
blV + SlF blF ; (G.7)blV = y^ + ^ + ( log y)^: (G.8)
(G.7) and (G.8) derive the equation of Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
G.3. Derivation of Equation (G.4)
We take the log of both sides of SlV = lV =l and totally dierentiate it to obtain
cSlV = blV   l^;
=SlF [ blF + y^ + ^ + ( log y)^] by Lemma 4 (G.9)
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SED =  (^ + cSlV ) and (G.9) derive (G.4) as follows:
[SED =  (^ + cSlV );
=  ^ + SlF
h blF   y^   ^   ( log y)^i ; by (G.9)
=
1
SlF + 
h
(SlF )
blF   (SlF )^   (1 + SlF log lV )^i : by (G.3)
Q.E.D.
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